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had occurred in Pomponio serve to illustrate the need to revise the anach-
ronistic criminal code to make it serve the needs of a technologically so-
phisticated society.'9 The Fourth Circuit, in Jenkins, clarified and appar-
ently reversed its previous position in Bailey by holding that Y.C.A. juris-
diction is based upon the offender's age at the time of a judicial determina-
tion of his guilt." In addition, the Jenkins decision aligns the Fourth Cir-
cuit with other federal courts which have decided this specific issue."
One of the decisions by the Fourth Circuit not involving common law
construction was important. The Fourth Circuit, in Williams, strength-
ened significantly the proposition that the interstate character of a ship-
ment of goods is to be determined by an assessment of all the circumstan-
ces surrounding the shipment." Perhaps more importantly, Williams was
the first federal case to hold definitively that a storage tank at the end of
a gasoline pipeline spur which does not belong to the pipeline owner may
reasonably be considered by a jury to be part of the pipeline under section
659 of the criminal code. The Taylor decision could ultimately prove signif-
icant also. In Taylor, the Fourth Circuit while remanding to the district
court for a determination of fact, decided that the establishment of a free
market for the valuation of marijuana might be possible."
CECIL C. POWELL, III
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Current Miranda Issues
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,' the ad-
missibility of a confession at trial primarily depended on whether that
statement had been made voluntarily. Voluntariness was determined
through examination of "the totality of the circumstances" surrounding
that statement.2 The new guidelines which Miranda established were de-
" See Criminal Law, Section A, text accompanying n.3.
20 See Criminal Law, Section A, text accompanying n. 41.
21 See Criminal Law, Section A, n.51.
22 See Criminal Law, Section B, n.12 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying n.3, supra.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 591 (1961). Under this test, courts
demonstrated concern in two particular areas: police conduct and personal data of the suspect
interrogated. Facts considered in the examination of police conduct included: incommuni-
cado detention, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966); threats, Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958); physical abuse, Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 743 (1948); and
duration of questioning, Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63-65 (1949). Important consid-
erations pertaining to the accused encompassed: age, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-
55 (1962); level of mentality, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 624-25, 630 (1961); and
mental stability, Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957). Application of the "totality of
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signed to inform a suspect of his constitutional rights3 prior to custodial
interrogation.4 Compliance with these guidelines, along with valid waiver,
are currently prerequisites to admissibility of statements made by an ac-
cused during custodial interrogation. 5 Despite the intention to reduce the
confusion which resulted from judicial administration of the voluntariness
standard, implementation of the Miranda guidelines has created new and
different problems.' A number of cases recently decided by the Fourth
the circumstances" standard served three basic objectives: assurance that confessions would
be reliable, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936); deterrence of improper police
conduct in securing a confession, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961); and
assurance that the confession obtained was the product of the free choice of the defendant,
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 321-22 (1963). In state proceedings, confessions judged
involuntary were excluded at trial because their use violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1963). Federal courts con-
fronting involuntary confession issues determined admissibility by a fifth amendment due
process standard despite an earlier case which measured admissibility against the fifth
amendment self-incrimination clause. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
The voluntariness test was supplemented with additional exclusionary rules. Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (deliberate attempt to secure information from a suspect
when retained counsel not present); FED. R. CRmm. P. 5(a), codifying Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, (1943).
3 The constitutional rights of an individual during custodial interrogation are the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to the assis-
tance of counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-70 (1966).
1 As defined by the majority in Miranda, "custodial interrogation" occurs when law
enforcement officials question an individual who has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444.
5 Id. at 476. Pursuant to the protection of the rights discussed in note 3 supra, the
Miranda Court stated that in the absence of alternate, equally effective procedures designed
to inform a suspect of his rights, law enforcement officials must advise a suspect that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him in court;
that he has the right to representation by counsel and the right to have counsel present during
questioning; and that he has the right to have counsel appointed if he so requests. 384 U.S.
at 469-73. The detail with which the Miranda opinion discussed physical and psychological
coercive pressures inherent in custodial interrogation, indicates the basis for these protective
rules. Id. at 446-55.
The Miranda guidelines designed to protect the suspect's right against compulsory self-
incrimination indicate the Supreme Court's extension of the analysis employed in Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the Supreme Court used a sixth amendment
right to counsel analysis to reverse defendant's conviction obtained in circumstances showing
extreme coercive pressure. Id. at 482, 490-91. The majority in Escobedo held that the defen-
dant had been denied assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment when he had
not been informed of his right to remain silent and when police refused his request to consult
with retained counsel. Id. The Court stated that the right to counsel attached at this point
because police interrogation conducted prior to the defendant's indictment was a "critical
stage" of the prosecution. Id. at 488. One reason advanced by the Miranda majority for
expanding and enlarging the scope of constitutional protection recognized in Escobedo, how-
ever, was the inconsistent results which Escobedo produced in lower court decisions. 384 U.S.
at 440 n.1 (citing cases). The majority's desire in Miranda to devise "concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow" is an aspect of the concern for
the earlier inconsistent results. Id. at 441-42.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 873 (1972) (Miranda warnings need not be given'at beginning of each interrogation
1978]
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Circuit examine several of these problems, including the scope of permissi-
ble police practice after the exercise of the right to counsel7 and the manner
in which waiver of the constitutional rights protected by Miranda can be
established." The analysis and resolution of the issues presented in these
cases poses the fundamental question of whether they signal a retreat from
the implementation by the Fourth Circuit of the intent and purpose of the
Miranda decision.
The Miranda Court acknowledged that rigid, unvarying compliance
with the Miranda guidelines structured to apprise a suspect during cus-
todial interrogation of his rights was not required and stated that alternate
procedures which operate adequately to inform a suspect of his rights
would be permissible.' In United States v. Sledge,10 the Fourth Circuit
examined one such alternate procedure. Instead of orally informing the
accused of his constitutional rights the agents in Sledge presented the
accused with a written form on which the Miranda warnings were printed,
allowing the accused to read the form and subsequently sign its waiver
provision."
Two federal agents visited the jail in which Sledge was incarcerated in
session); United States v. De La Cruz, 420 F.2d 1093, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1970) (questioning of
suspect at airport with circumstances showing suspect's culpability constitutes custodial
interrogation); United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969); cert. denied, 397 U.S.
990 (1970) (objective test for determining when situation "custodial" in absence of actual
arrest).
United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 980 (1977).
Harris v. Riddle, 551 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1977).
384 U.S. at 476. Congress has enacted legislation intended as an effective equivalent
to the Miranda guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970). Under this statute, a confession is
admitted into evidence when the trial judge determines its voluntariness in light of the
totality of the circumstances. This determination is made outside the presence of the jury.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(b) (1970). Subsection (b) incorporates several of the Miranda guidelines
as factors to be included in the voluntariness determination, including the defendant's knowl-
edge that he was not required to speak, that any statement he made could be used at trial,
and that he had a right to assistance of counsel prior to questioning. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(3)
& (4) (1970). This subsection also lists factors included in analysis in pre-Escobedo cases,
such as elapsed time between arrest and arraignment and the confession, and whether the
defendant knew the nature of the offense of which he was suspected or charged. 18 U.S.C. §
3501(b)(1) & (2) (1970); see note 2 supra. Federal circuit courts of appeal have demonstrated
an unwillingness to rule on the constitutionality of § 3501. See United States v. Vigo, 487
F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1973); Ailsworth v. United States, 448 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1971);
Gandara, ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS: IMPLE-
MENTATION OF SECTION 3501 BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND THE
COURTS, 63 GEO. L.J. 305, 313 (1974).
10 546 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1185 (1977).
11 546 F.2d at 1121. The following waiver form, taken from United States v. Cooper, 499
F.2d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1974), is a representative example of the written waiver statement.
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am
willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this
time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been
made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
Id. at 1061, n.1.
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order to question him about a Virginia bank robbery.'2 Sledge had been
arrested previously on an unrelated charge and prior to any questioning the
agents gave Sledge a printed "advice of rights" form to read which also
contained a written waiver clause. 3 Sledge read the form, stated that he
understood what he had read, signed the waiver provision and admitted
his involvement in the bank robbery. 4 On appeal, the defendant argued
that the procedure through which he was informed of his rights did not
comply with Miranda. 15 The Fourth Circuit found this claim to be without
merit and held permissible the practice of having the defendant read the
Miranda warnings from a printed rights and waiver form supplied by fed-
eral agents." The defendant's motion to suppress his inculpatory state-
ments concerning the robbery was therefore properly denied by the trial
court. 7
Although the utilization of printed waiver forms examined in Sledge
does not represent a new development," the court's continued approval of
11 The charge for which Sledge initially was arrested is not specified in the Fourth
Circuit's opinion. The federal agents visiting the defendant's cell did inform him, however,
that a warrant for a Virginia bank robbery had been issued for his arrest and that their
questions would concern this alleged crime. 546 F.2d at 1121.
13 Id.
1Id.
" Id. at 1121. The Fourth Circuit discounted the testimony of the defendant at the
suppression hearing that he was physically unable to understand the warnings because of a
drug solution which he had taken earlier. The Sledge court did not discuss the content of the
warnings on the printed form, presumably because the defendant did not raise any issue
regarding the literal adequacy of the warnings contained. Id. at 1121-22. The Supreme Court
recently passed on the issue of adequate warnings in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
Petitioner in Tucker was not told when orally given his Miranda warnings that counsel would
be furnished for him if he so desired. Id. at 436. The majority in Tucker concluded that a
distinction could be drawn between the constitutional right recognized in Miranda and the
"prophylactic rules" (warnings) designed to protect those rights. Violation of the latter do
not automatically compel the conclusion of a constitutional violation. Id. at 439. For criticism
of this decision as an erosion of the Miranda decision, see Note, Michigan v. Tucker: A
Warning About Miranda, 17 Aiz. L. REv. 188 (1975); Note, Michigan v. Tucker: A Reevalua-
tion of Miranda, 27 ME. L. REv. 365 (1975).
The adequacy of the warnings given to the suspect must be judged in terms of their
collective impact. Wright v. North Carolina, 483 F.2d 405, 406-07 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 936 (1974) (warnings as a whole do convey essentials of Miranda warnings). Compare
Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir. 1972) with Massimo v. United States, 463
F.2d 1171, 1173 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1117 (1973). For a discussion of proper
warnings which clearly inform a suspect of his rights, see Griffins & Ayres, A Postscript to
the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967); Medalie,
Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to
Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. Rlv. 1347 (1968).
' 546 F.2d at 1122.
' Id. at 1121-22. The motion to suppress evidence must be made before trial. FED. R.
CRum. P. 12(b)(3). A determination that evidence sought to be used in the upcoming trial will
be suppressed renders that evidence inadmissible.
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 524 F.2d 593, 594 (10th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Alexander, 441 F.2d 403, 404 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278,
1279-80 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Osterburg, 423 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
19781
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this procedure remains of considerable importance to law enforcement
officials within the Fourth Circuit. The signature of the defendant on a
printed waiver form, indicating his waiver of both the right to remain silent
and the right to retained or appointed counsel, can help ease the heavy
burden which the government must meet to establish valid waiver as a
prerequisite to the admissibility of the statements of an accused obtained
during custodial interrogation.' 9 Presuming that the interrogating agents
are convinced of the suspect's reading ability, the signature of the suspect
below the carefully worded waiver provisions"0 assists the government in
demonstrating that the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived the rights contained in the Miranda warnings.' Sledge indicates a
practical effort by the Fourth Circuit to assure that a suspect's Miranda
rights have been carefully observed while at the same time providing flexi-
bility for federal agents as to the manner in which these rights are ob-
served.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Harris v. Riddle,"2 however, clouds the
re-affirmation in Sledge of the importance of written waiver forms. Harris
indicates that failure to sign a written waiver will not preclude a finding
of knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Although the defendant in
Harris freely admitted his participation in a Virginia bank robbery after
having been given his rights orally by the state police, he refused to execute
a written waiver. 3 The defendant indicated his understanding of the warn-
ings on each of the three occasions officers warned him of his rights, but
nevertheless persisted in his refusal-to sign a written waiver. 4 His inculpa-
tory statements, which were admitted at trial and which formed the basis
of the defendant's felony-murder conviction, established that the defen-
dant was present at the bank robbery with a firearm in his possession., In
seeking habeas corpus relief, the defendant argued that his waiver was
399 U.S. 914 (1970); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1022 (1970).
,1 See 384 U.S. at 476. See generally Recent Cases, Criminal Law-Confessions-
Government Can Satisfy its Burden of Proving Waiver of Miranda Rights by Showing Warn-
ings Given, Signed Waiver, and Proof of Defendant's Capacity to Understand the Warnings,
26 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1973).
2 See note 11 supra.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc). For further
discussion of circumstances which establish the validity of waiver, including failure to sign a
written waiver form, see text accompanying note 33 infra.
22 551 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1977).
2 Id. at 937.
24 Id. One of the interrogating officers knew the parents of the defendant and telephoned
them to come to the stationhouse when the defendant refused to sign the waiver but contin-
ued to discuss his involvement in the robbery. The defendant was permitted to telephone both
his girlfriend and his sister. When offered the opportunity, the defendant also declined to
speak in private with a relative who was present at the police station. Id. This police behavior
may indicate their awareness of the defendant's youth and confusion and their desire to avoid





invalid since his ignorance of the substantive criminal law pertaining to
felony-murder rendered his waiver "unintelligent.""8 The issue before the
Fourth Circuit concerned whether law enforcement officers have the duty
not only to inform the suspect fully of his constitutional rights, but to
explain the consequences of his failure to exercise these rights in order to
render a waiver knowing and intelligent." The Fourth Circuit held that
Miranda did not compel police to explain the intricacies of admissibility
of evidence or substantive criminal law and concluded that the duty of
police is discharged when they have "fully and fairly" warned a suspect of
his constitutional rights.2 Thus, waiver is "intelligent" if the suspect elects
to speak with the awareness that he has the right to remain silent and the
right to retained or appointed counsel.
20
The adequacy of Miranda warnings are important in determining
whether the suspect is aware of his constitutional rights since waiver will
not be knowing or intelligent if the warnings are deficient.2 The duty of
law enforcement officers is, therefore, to communicate adequate warnings
to the suspect. 1 To impose the further requirement that these officers
correct a suspect's possible misconception regarding the inculpatory thrust
of his statements is, as the Harris court recognized, a task beyond the
training and capability of the average interrogating officer. 2 The Fourth
Circuit's conclusion as to the validity of Harris' waiver represents the
product of two distinct inquiries, both resolved through close examination
of factual conditions surrounding the waiver. Initially, the failure of the
defendant to sign the written waiver form, in light of the voluntary nature
of his own admissions, did not prevent a finding of voluntary waiver
23
21 Id. at 937-38.
21 Id. at 938.
, Id.
"Id. at 939.
3 See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Wright v. North Carolina, 483 F.2d
495, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1972);
Massimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171, 1173 (2d Cir. 1972).
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-77 (1966).
12 551 F.2d at 938; see United States v. Mix, 446 F.2d 615, 621 (5th Cir. 1971) (no police
duty to determine separate waiver of each Miranda warning); United States v. Van Dusen,
431 F.2d 1278, 1280 (1st Cir. 1970) (no obligation by law enforcement officers to correct
mistaken belief regarding implication of suspect's statements); United States v. Hall, 396
F.2d 841, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 918 (1968) (rejection of defendant's claim that
knowing waiver impossible unless aware of punishment for conviction); United States v.
Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 491, 495 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (no duty to correct misconception regarding
likelihood of prosecution) (mem.).
" 551 F.2d at 937. In United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1006 (1968), the Fourth Circuit held that circumstances surrounding statements of
an accused may be examined to determine whether waiver had been knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. Id. at 377-78. Circumstances relevant to a determination of the equivalent of
express waiver would include the time of the arrest, the completeness of the warnings given,
and evidence of coercion. Id. at 378. Subsequent cases in the Fourth Circuit have demon-
strated a willingness to examine the defendant's statements to the police. United States v.
Wyatt, 561 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1977) (request for counsel to arrange for bond does not indicate
1978]
498 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Secondly, examination of the circumstances under which the warnings
were given, as well as the adequacy of those warnings, conclusively deter-
mined the knowing and intelligent waiver of Harris' constitutional rights.3
Harris casts considerable doubt on the importance of written waiver
forms. Just as the signature of a suspect on such a form will not conclu-
sively establish a valid waiver, refusal to execute a written waiver does not
compel the conclusion that waiver was not valid.35 In either situation, the
surrounding circumstances are carefully examined to determine whether
waiver had been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Thus, the execution
of a written waiver or the failure to execute a waiver becomes simply an
additional circumstance to be considered and serves to widen the scope of
inquiry in the waiver determination.3 6 Continued reliance on written
waiver forms without clarifying their importance may only lead to confu-
sion by leaving unclear the significance to be accorded the suspect's signa-
ture in the station house and the courts. Two alternate procedures could
mitigate the adverse consequences of this confusion. First, abandoning
entirely the use of written waivers would restrict the scope of relevant
circumstances surrounding waiver. 3 A second approach would be to accord
the written waiver of an accused presumptive validity once it has been
demonstrated that there was a proper administration of rights and that the
suspect understood the warnings. The individual alleging a Miranda viola-
tion would then have the burden of going forward with evidence to demon-
strate that his signature did not represent a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver.3 8 A practice of initially according written waiver pre-
sumptive validity would have the advantage of dispelling confusion as to
the current validity of written waivers in light of the uncertainty arising
from a comparison of Sledge and Harris.
3 9
While Sledge and Harris leave unresolved the consequences and im-
portance of written waiver, United States v. Grant" raises the more funda-
mental question of the Fourth Circuit's adherence to the principles on
exercise of right to counsel warranting termination of questioning); Taylor v. Riddle, 563 F.2d
133 (4th Cir. 1977) (mere indication of inability to answer a police question does not establish
exercise of right to remain silent). For authority in other federal circuits, see AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.8 n.12 (App. Draft 1975). See
also Comment, Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogations: Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36
U. Cm. L. REV. 413 (1969).
551 F.2d at 938.
United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 377-78.
31 Id.; see note 33 supra.
31 The Seventh Circuit has taken this approach regarding written waiver in United States
v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972). See United
States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1968) (refusal to waive rights followed by
submission to interrogation indicates contradictory position requiring police to inquire as to
suspect's understanding before continuation of questioning).
3' See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
40 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977).
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which the Miranda majority based their decision." The defendant in Grant
was arrested in connection with a South Carolina bank robbery and was
read the Miranda warnings by a federal agent. The defendant signed a
printed waiver form and was returned to his cell when he persisted in
denying his involvement in the robbery. 2 Federal agents returned to the
defendant's cell after a brief period of time to inform Grant of charges
pending against him for a Virginia bank robbery. 3 The defeiidant signed
another written waiver form after again being read the Miranda warnings.
He exercised his right to consult with an attorney shortly after questioning
began and the interrogation ceased. 4 Subsequently, after providing rou-
tine identification information, the defendant initiated a line of conversa-
tion in which he sought details on the Virginia robbery. During the course
of this conversation, the defendant admitted knowledge of the crime. The
agents present administered the Miranda warnings to the defendant for the
third time and additionally reminded him of his request for a lawyer, but
the defendant elected to make incriminating statements that were admit-
ted into evidence at his trial." The statements made voluntarily by the
defendant in Grant during a conversation which he initiated did not violate
Miranda's prohibition of custodial interrogation after exercise of the right
to counsel."
" The primary concern of the Miranda majority with the coercive pressures of station-
house interrogation followed from its analysis of the following factors: a suspect's isolation;
the unfamiliar surroundings; and a variety of deceptive interrogation techniques. 384 U.S.
at 446-56.
42 549 F.2d at 944-45.
'3 Id. at 945.
" Id.
11 Id. The defendant manifested great concern over the specifics of the Richmond robbery
charge. He asked whether he would be returned to Richmond and sought details concerning
other aspects of the crime. The FBI agent told the defendant all he knew about the crime,
indicating that several suspects had been taken into custody. Id.
11 Id. The Fourth Circuit examined the circumstances surrounding the defendant's with-
drawal of his request for counsel to ascertain any evidence of police coercion. Id. at 945-46.
The defendant affirmatively stated his desire to waive his earlier request for counsel thereby
removing possible issues concerning implied waiver. See Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, 122
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976) (waiver implied from voluntary nature of
defendant's statement); United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200, 1204 (5th Cir. 1974)
(establishing waiver in the absence of express waiver).
,1 549 F.2d at 948. The exercise by a suspect of his right to remain silent will operate to
proscribe police behavior in a different fashion than exercise of right to counsel during cus-
todial interrogation. In Strickland v. Garrison, No. 76-1683 (4th Cir. June 28, 1976),
disposition recorded, 538 F.2d 325 (1976), the defendant halted questioning after receiving
his Miranda warnings by expressing a desire for appointed counsel. The state agent who had
begun the interrogation approached the defendant six hours later on his own initiative and
again administered the Miranda warnings. The defendant indicated his understanding of the
warnings and in the absence of counsel, confessed. No. 76-1683, slip op. at 3. The Fourth
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court denying habeas corpus relief and held that
the state agent had acted improperly in approaching the defendant in order to seek additional
information. Id., at 6. The Strickland court noted that a suspect who has invoked the right
to counsel must be dealt with after this election only through his lawyer if information is
1978]
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On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility of his state-
ments by contending that the questioning by federal agents, after he had
expressed a desire to consult with a lawyer, was conducted in violation of
Miranda.4" The Grant majority concluded that the confession was properly
admitted at trial and upheld the defendant's conviction. 9 The court rea-
soned that investigative questioning of a suspect differed from inquiries
intended to elicit information pursuant to police booking procedures."0
When a suspect requests counsel, investigative questioning must cease and
statements subsequently obtained in the absence of counsel are inadmissi-
ble. 5' The Fourth Circuit held, however, that questions which law enforce-
sought concerning the crime. Id. This is particularly true where, as in Strickland, the police
had not yet secured counsel for the accused. Id., at 5-6. The Fourth Circuit in Strickland did
acknowledge, however, that subsequent interrogation may begin only if the accused indepen-
dently indicates a willingness to resume questioning. Id. at 4; Accord United States v. Clark,
499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1972).
Grant may be distinguished from Strickland if the Grant majority's conception of investi-
gative questioning is accepted. The court in Grant concluded that solicitation of booking
information differs from investigative questioning and the statement voluntarily made by the
defendant in Grant did not violate Strickland's ban on statements obtained after exercise of
the right to counsel. See text accompanying notes 52 & 56 infra. On the other hand, exercise
of the right to remain silent will not preclude subsequent attempts to seek crime related
information despite no indication from the accused that he wishes to resume interrogation.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The defendant in Mosley exercised his right to
remain silent in connection with police questioning concerning several local robberies. Several
hours later, another detective seeking information on an unrelated murder charge approached
Mosley and read the Miranda warnings to him. Id. at 98. The detective confronted the
defendant with information that another individual had named him as the "shooter" in the
murder. The defendant's incriminating statements were admitted against him at the state
trial in which he was convicted of murder. Id. at 99. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant's Miranda rights had not been violated. Id. at 102.
The Mosley majority reasoned that subsequent efforts by police to seek a valid waiver
or procure information pertaining to another crime would not be improper so long as the
accused is aware that he has the right to terminate questioning at any time, contingent upon
the police "scrupulously" honoring that right. Id. at 103. This knowledge or awareness would
counteract the "coercive pressures of the custodial setting." Id. at 104. The Mosley decision
has been criticized as a limitation on the protection formerly afforded by Miranda, with some
critics particularly noting the failure of the majority in Mosley to further define how police
"scrupulously honor" the right to stop questioning. See generally Comment, Michigan v.
Mosley: A Further Erosion of Miranda?, 13 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 861 (1976); Note, Michigan v.
Mosley: A New Constitutional Procedure, 54 N.C.L. REv. 695 (1976).
,1 549 F.2d at 947. The defendant did not challenge the right of a law enforcement officer
to secure identification information from a suspect after he had invoked a Miranda right. See
text accompanying note 45 supra. Rather, Grant argued that the solicitation of booking
information after his request for a lawyer was a "masquerade" devised by police to prolong
the interview, since booking information had been given to police at the time of his initial
arrest. 549 F.2d at 947; see note 51 infra.
549 F.2d at 948.
Id. at 946. For the purpose of protection afforded by Miranda in the context of incrimi-
nating statements, there is a difference between a police request for the suspect's address and
a request for the suspect's whereabouts at the time of the crime. One inquiry seeks informa-
tion pursuant to police booking procedures, the other is designed to elicit information to aid
possible prosecution. See note 53 infra.
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). Custodial interrogation after the exercise
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ment officials direct to a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel
which do not deal with participation in the crime alleged, do not violate
Miranda because Miranda was not intended to govern these circumstan-
ces.
5 2
The majority in Grant summarily rejected the defendant's contention
that seeking booking information for a second time was a faintly disguised
effort by the agents to maintain coercive pressure and obtain an admis-
sion.53 The rejection of this argument may indicate a retreat from the
Fourth Circuit's adherence to Miranda's underlying premise regarding
coercion. 4 In particular, the language employed by the court in Grant55
ignores the coercive nature of the stationhouse environment and its possi-
ble effect on a defendant.56 The Fourth Circuit also failed to note the
potential for abuse which may accompany the police practice sanctioned
in Grant. For example, assume that the victim has previously conveyed to
the police certain biographical data which the perpetrator related to the
victim at the time of the crime, but the suspect refuses to answer any
questions and invokes his right to counsel. Although solicitation of back-
ground data from the suspect in this situation is not coercive, solicitation
is inconsistent with Miranda's command that questioning designed to
of the right to remain silent or the right to counsel would subject the accused to the coercive
pressures which Miranda sought to guard against. Ferguson v. Boyd, No. 76-2034 (4th Cir.,
Oct. 11, 1977); United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 947 (1971); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1969).
52 549 F.2d at 946; see Hines v. Lavallee, 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir. 1974); AMERiCAN
LAW INsTrruTE, MoE. CODE OF PRE-ARRiGNMENr PROCEDURE § 140.8(5) (App. Draft 1975).
But cf. Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (seeking booking
information in a police station constitutes- custodial interrogation and police intent irrele-
vant); United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942, 949 (4th Cir. 1977) (Winter, J., dissenting)
(arguing for application of Proctor to the issues in Grant).
u 549 F.2d at 947. One of the interrogating agents testifying at the defendant's trial in
Grant stated that the second stage of solicitation of booking data obtained "additional back-
ground and descriptive" information. The agent also indicated that different information is
taken from a suspect under arrest than from a subject who is being interviewed. 549 F.2d at
948-49 (Winter, J., dissenting). The information sought to be obtained in this second stage
of booking questioning did not, therefore, merely repeat information previously obtained.
" 384 U.S. at 446-55.
Regarding the resolicitation of booking information from the defendant, the Grant
majority wrote: "[I]t was about as easy for the investigating officer to go through the
standard questions again as to secure the same information by reference to his [interrogating
agent's] report of his first interview with Grant." 549 F.2d at 947.
" See, e.g., Ferguson v. Boyd, No. 76-2043 (4th Cir., Oct. 11, 1977); Blackmon v. Black-
ledge, 541 F.2d 1070 (4th Cir. 1976). The implicit belief of the Grant majority that the coercive
pressures at the police station do not arise unless incriminating information is sought is
analogous to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977). The Mathiason Court concluded that interrogation at police headquarters of a suspect
not under arrest was neither coercive nor custodial. Id. at 713-14. Both Mathiason and
Grant indicate that courts no longer give literal application of Miranda's examination of the
coercive pressures discussed in note 41 supra.
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elicit incriminating statements must cease if the right to counsel is exer-
cised.-7
The future resolution of Miranda issues in the Fourth Circuit is likely
to be complicated by Sledge, Harris, and Grant. If the Fourth Circuit is
indeed committed to the belief that a suspect's written waiver can assist
the government in establishing knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver,
it must adopt a firm position on written waivers and attach some indicia
of importance to a suspect's signature.58 In addition, the Fourth Circuit's
sanction in Grant of a police practice which appears to ignore the coercive
pressures of the custodial setting may indicate a retreat from the consistent
application of the express intent and purpose of Miranda in regard to
protecting suspects from stationhouse pressures. 9
5 Hypothetical based on Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1975).
See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
51 Compare United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1977) with Strickland v.
Garrison, No. 76-1683 (4th Cir. June 28, 1976), disposition recorded, 538 F.2d 325 (1976).
The Fourth Circuit has recently considered the issues presented in circumstances where
the suspect is adequately informed of his rights prior to interrogation but elects to remain
silent. In Reid v. Riddle, 550 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth Circuit examined the
prosecutor's use of a defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes at trial. On
cross-examination and in closing argument the prosecutor attempted to impeach the credibil-
ity of the defendant by stressing the contrast of post-arrest silence with the exculpatory
nature of the defendant's trial defense. Id. at 1004. On appeal, the defendant contended that
the use of his post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes violated his due process rights.
Id. at 1003. The Fourth Circuit agreed holding that a suspect has an absolute right to remain
silent and that use of silence for impeachment purposes violated the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 1004. The Fourth Circuit stated that the prosecutor's repeated impeachment attempts
prevented them from concluding that the error of impeachment had not affected beyond a
reasonable doubt the jury's deliberations. Id.; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-7 (1963). For additional discussion of the issues
raised by the prosecution's impeachment attempts, see Hayton v. Egeler, 555 F.2d 599, 603-
04 (6th Cir. 1977); Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 US. 908 (1977); Meeks v. Havener, 545 F.2d 9, 10 (6th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
2980 (1977); Booton v. Hanauer, 541 F.2d 296, 299 (1st Cir. 1976).
The Fourth Circuit stated in Reid that Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), controlled
the issues raised by the defendant. The Supreme Court in Doyle concluded that post-arrest
silence was "insolubly ambiguous" and must therefore be presumed to follow from the exer-
cise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 617. This result in
Doyle closely followed a prior decision, United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), which
concluded that the probative value of a defendant's post-arrest silence was outweighed by
the prejudicial impact of admitting it into evidence. Id. at 173.
Prior to Reid, a defendant attacking the prosecution's trial use of post-arrest silence
initially had to demonstrate that this silence affirmatively constituted exercise of his consti-
tutional right to remain silent. United States v. Ghiz, 491 F.2d 599, 600 (4th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1286 (4th Cir. 1973). Since the Reid court failed to
fully analyze and discuss its holding, its effect within the Fourth Circuit remains unclear.
This uncertainty must be resolved by future litigation because Reid's implications extend to
the prosecution's trial tactics and the manner in which counsel must structure their due
process arguments. Recent Supreme Court cases dealing with impeachment issues in the
Miranda context are Oregon v. Hass. 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971). See generally Comment, Criminal Procedure-Admissibility of Confes-
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B. Procedural Mechanisms for Securing an Impartial Jury
The Constitution confers the right to trial by an impartial jury upon
criminal defendants in state and federal prosecutions.' The selection of
impartial jurors pursuant to this constitutional mandate has been compli-
cated in recent years by the availability of information related to a crime
and its suspects in the popular media before a case goes to trial.2 This
increases the possibility that the individuals summoned as prospective
jurors may have been exposed to details of the crime that could result in
prejudice against the defendant.3 Similarly, juror impartiality is question-
able when service as a juror in a prior case involving the same defendant
may result in that juror determining guilt on evidence extrinsic to the
present trial.4 Statutes which provide procedures for discovering prospec-
tive jurors who are unable to serve impartially thus have become increas-
ingly important in safeguarding the defendant's constitutional rights. Voir
dire examination' and peremptory challenges' are two statutory procedures
sions-Dancing on the Grave of Miranda?-Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 10 SUFFOLK L. REv.
1141, 1164-72 (1976); Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: The
Rule of Harris v. New York, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 441.
' U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 2 together with U.S. CONST., amend. VI guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury. The sixth amendment provides in
part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." Despite this broad language, a jury trial is not
available in every criminal prosecution. The severity of the penalty for the offense charged
generally determines when a jury trial is available. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937). A jury trial is available to a defendant charged with an offense
punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of six months. See Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 159-62 (1968). See generally Orfield, Trial By Jury in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 1962 DUKE L.J. 29, 29-38. In state criminal proceedings, the fourteenth amend-
ment has been held to encompass the right to trial by an impartial jury. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391, U.S. at 148-49. The majority in Duncan stated that a jury trial is available to a defendant
in a state prosecution if a jury trial were available for a defendant similarly charged in a
federal prosecution. Id. at 149.
Unlike civil litigants, criminal defendants need not demand a jury trial. Compare FED.
R. Civ. P. 38(b) with FED. R. Cram. P. 23(a). See generally, 1 E. DEvrrT & C. BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 1.02 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as DEvrrr &
BLACKMAR]. Statutes may require the defendant to demand a jury trial in particular instances
however. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (criminal contempt proceedings);
18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1970) (demand of jury trial required in criminal contempt proceeding).
2 See United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (involving details of
Watergate break-in); United States v. Bryant, 471 F.2d 1040, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1112-(1973) (information pertaining to venue motion). See generally Com-
ment, Pretrial Publicity, Voir Dire and A Fair Trial, 21 S.D. L. REv. 373 (1976).
For a suggested procedure designed to screen those individuals possibly exposed to large
amounts of publicity on voir dire examination, see ABA, FAIR TRIAL & FREE PRESS § 3.4 (App.
Draft 1968). See note 5 infra.
E.g., Donovan v. Davis, 558 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1977); Wall v. Superintendent, 553 F.2d
359 (4th Cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 30-47 infra.
Voir dire examination involves questioning prospective jurors summoned for service in
a particular case, either individually or as a group. Voir dire examination is conducted in
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designed to help secure an impartial jury.7 The Fourth Circuit recently
examined the interrelationship of these two procedural devices and their
place in the jury selection process in United States v. Rucker.5
In Rucker, two prospective jurors summoned for possible service in the
defendant's trial failed to complete a qualification questionnaire before
returning it to the trial court The two prospective jurors failed to answer
order to determine which jurors among those on the prospective panel are not impartial or
lack competence in a physical or mental sense and to provide information on which court and
counsel may base decisions regarding exercise of their jury challenges. See, e.g., United States
v. Blount. 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bryant, 471 F.2d 1040, 1044-45
(D.C. Cir. 1972). FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) controls voir dire in federal prosecutions and permits
the defendant and counsel to question prospective jurors if the court allows. The trial judge
may receive questions intended for the prospective panel submitted by counsel and use these
inquiries at his discretion. DEVITT & BLACKMAR, supra note 1, at § 3.01; 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 381-82 (1969 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. See
generally Note, Voir Dire In Federal Criminal Trials: Protecting the Defendant's Right to an
Impartial Jury, 48 IND. L.J. 269 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Voir Dire].
Whether the court or counsel should conduct voir dire is a matter of continuing contro-
versy. Proponents of voir dire conducted by counsel stress that counsel's familiarity with the
relevant facts and issues of each case will result in more effective questioning of prospective
jurors. See Comment, Voir Dire Examination-Court or Counsel, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 234,
239-41 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Court or Counsel]. Those favoring court examination
argue that counsel can often cleverly introduce prejudicial information on voir dire, increasing
the possibility that information inadmissible at trial be considered in subsequent jury deter-
minations. Compare Voir Dire, supra at 271-72 with Note, Voir Dire: Prevention of Prejudicial
Questioning, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1088 (1966). See Court or Counsel, supra at 241-45. Others
oppose any procedure which serves to lengthen court time consumed by voir dire examination,
arguing that this time and expense outweighs the advantages of voir dire. See generally Levit,
Nelson, Ball & Chernick Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 916
(1971); Note, The Jury Voir Dire: Useless Delay or Valuable Technique, 11 S.D. L. REV. 306
(1966).
' The exercise of peremptory challenges remains within the discretion of counsel. The
challenges are invoked against particular jurors "for a real or imagined partiality that is less
easily designated or demonstrable [than challenges for cause]." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 220 (1965). Thus, peremptory challenges are employed by counsel to remove from a
prospective jury panel those individuals whom counsel believes will be unsympathetic to his
case, but who cannot or have not been removed by challenge for cause. Stilson v. United
States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). For
discussion of the challenge for cause, see note 11 infra. In federal prosecutions, FED. R. CRIM.
P. 24(b) sets forth the number of peremptory challenges allowed to counsel. Although the
Constitution does not guarantee the right of peremptory challenge, their source can be traced
from federal statutes enacted in the nineteenth century. See Act of June 8, 1872, Ch. 333, 17
Stat. 282. The manner in which peremptory challenges are exercised varies. Counsel may
alternate in striking jurors from the panel or simultaneously submit a list of those jurors who
are to be removed from the panel. See, e.g., Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 748 (9th
Cir. 1963). For a discussion of peremptory challenges, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
212-20 (1965); DEVITT & BLACKMAR, supra note 1, at § 3.03; WRIGHT, supra note 5, at §§ 384-
87.
See note 25 infra.
- 557 F.2d 1046 (4th Cir. 1977).
1 Id. at 1047. Juror qualification forms are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a), (b) (1970).
These forms aid the trial court in determining whether the individuals to whom they are sent
meet the statutory qualifications set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1970). These statutory require-
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adequately questions concerning physical or mental infirmities which may
have imparied their ability to serve competently on the jury. 0 Defense
counsel moved to examine further these two jurors on voir dire and chal-
lenged for cause" the juror who had indicated on his questionnaire that he
suffered from an infirmity. 2 The judge denied the challenge for cause and
the request for further examination.'" Instead of extended voir dire, the
judge asked if any panel member suffered from a disability possibly im-
pairing his capacity to sit as a juror." This inquiry drew no response and
the two prospective jurors remained on the jury panel until removed
through the exercise of two peremptory challenges by defense counsel.'
5
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendant claimed that the failure
of the trial judge to question the two jurors more completely resulted in a
voir dire examination which failed to reveal whether the two jurors were
competent for jury service and which prevented meaningful exercise by the
defense of its peremptory challenges." The Fourth Circuit held that when
the trial judge had reason to believe, from information supplied by the two
prospective jurors, that they may have lacked the qualifications to serve
competently as jurors, defense counsel's request for further voir dire should
have been granted.'"
ments include citizenship, ability to read and comprehend English, mental and physical
fitness, and absence of a pending felony charge or conviction.
"1 559 F.2d at 1047. The questionnaire in Rucker included two questions concerning the
existence of physical or mental infirmities and directed the prospective juror to describe the
nature of any disability. Id. Of the two jurors involved, one failed to expand on his admission
of infirmity, while the other disregarded both questions. Id.
" Id. Unlike peremptory challenges, see note 6 supra, challenges for cause are made by
counsel when he believes that he can support by specific evidence a particular juror's lack of
competence, bias or prejudice. See DEvrr & BLACKMAR, supra note 1, at § 3.02; 3 L. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES, §§ 24.83-93 (1966 & Supp. 1977); WRIGHT,
supra note 5, at § 383. Challenges based on federal statutory qualifications required of jurors
are measured against 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1970). Challenges for cause concerning possible bias
can be separated into actual bias and bias that is presumed as a matter of law. United States
v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936). A challenge for actual bias generally has its source in the
express admission of a juror during voir dire examination. United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d
980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 1120 (1969). In assessing challenges for cause
based on a theory of presumed bias, the trial judge disregards a juror's voir dire statements
and closely examines the juror's connection with aspects of the present case, e.g., kinship,
employer-employee relationship. Id. at 984. A particular juror must be challenged at the
inception of the trial to permit replacement without additional delay or cost. United States
v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968).
,2 557 F.2d at 1047.
,' Id. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Rucker does not reveal the precise grounds for the
challenge by defense counsel and 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4) (1970) does not include specific kinds
of mental or physical disabilities which would disqualify a prospective juror from service.
Counsel may, of course, privately investigate a prospective juror's qualifications in order to
have a firm basis for his challenges for cause. See Voir Dire, supra note 5, at 272.
" 557 F.2d at 1047.
Is Id.
I Id.
I d. at 1049.
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The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establish that the trial judge
is vested with broad discretion concerning the scope of voir dire examina-
tion. 8 The exercise of this discretion is limited by the "essential demands
of fairness."'" The factual situations presented by particular trials will
control the content of this limitation. Significant factors which must be
considered in determining whether fairness is achieved include the nature
of the case, possible racial prejudice, and the nature of the prospective jury
panel.? Thus in Rucker, the Fourth Circuit stressed that voir dire exami-
nation conducted by the trial court did not foreclose the possibility that
either or both of the jurors were incapable of competent jury service. 2' The
Rucker majority emphasized that the issue of the fitness of a particular
juror was a fundamental issue, no less important than juror bias or preju-
dice.2 The Fourth Circuit asserted that inadequate voir dire examination
compelled defense counsel to exercise his peremptory challenges against
the potentially incompetent jurors in a "speculative" fashion.?2 "Fairness",
then, requires the trial court to conduct voir dire examination sufficient
to allow counsel the opportunity "to exercise his challenges in a reasonably
intelligent manner .. ."I Rucker, therefore, demonstrates the mutual
dependence of voir dire and peremptory challenges as mechanisms which
function to remove partiality and incompetence from the jury.2
, FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(a).
, See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1931) (discretion exceeded when
trial judge inadequately examined prospective jurors on issue of racial prejudice); accord,
United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970) (discretion exceeded when trial judge
improperly denied counsel's request for examination on racial prejudice).
E.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (circumstances showing a black defen-
dant charged with assault of a white policeman in Massachusetts did not warrant extended
voir dire); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973) (voir dire held inadequate in case
involving trial of black civil rights activist for civil rights related offense in hostile local
.environment); accord, United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (further
voir dire is warranted in circumstances where bias may result particularly in matters likely
to affect the local community); United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir. 1976)
(insanity defense merits inquiry into juror attitudes on psychiatry and related matters). See
generally Note, Voir Dire The Right to Question Jurors on Racial Prejudice, 37 OHIo ST. L.J.
412 (1976); Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Voir Dire: Constitutional Requirements and
Policy Considerations, 54 B.U.L. Rav. 394 (1974). As noted in Ristaino and Ham, counsel may
submit questions to the court to be asked on voir dire. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 59; Ham
v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. at 526. The court, however, is not required to ask these questions.
FED. R. CaM. P. 24(a); see note 5 supra.
21 557 F.2d at 1048. Individual voir dire examination could have revealed a possible
infirmity which the trial court's general inquiry would not have discovered. Examination of
each juror individually, for example, would have uncovered a possible hearing defect, whereas
a general inquiry conceivably could not have discovered this defect.
2 Id.
23 Id. To require counsel to exercise peremptory challenges in a speculative fashion would
undercut the intention of voir dire as a procedure whose function is to reveal the presence of
incompetence or bias so that an offending juror may be challenged. See, e.g., United States
v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 372 (7th Cir. 1972); cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); see note 5
supra.
2, 557 F.2d at 1048.
' For recent cases which underscore the close relationship between voir dire and peremp-
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The Fourth Circuit's holding in Rucker is in accord with other federal
circuits on the issue of voir dire and its relation to peremptory challenges. 6
The Rucker case, however, is unique in that it widens the proper scope of
voir dire examination from inquiries concerning bias or prejudice to situa-
tions involving the physical and mental qualifications of prospective ju-
rors. Thus, the likely impact of Rucker in future jury trials will be to
prolong litigation by extending the time expended on voir dire examina-
tion."
In addition, the majority in Rucker stated that an erroneous denial of
a challenge for cause which reduces the number of peremptory challenges
available to counsel constitutes reversible error." Apart from having to
demonstrate that the challenge for cause should have been granted, coun-
sel must normally show that he has exhausted all of his peremptory chal-
lenges in the course of the jury selection process. If counsel has not ex-
tory challenges, see United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3261 (1977); United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir. 1976); United.
States v. Segal, 534 F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651
(6th Cir. 1973). See Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1493 (1975).
2 See note 25 supra. In United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1976), the defen-
dant had allegedly embezzled funds from a labor union of which he was an elected officer.
During voir dire examination, one prospective juror openly expressed his bias against labor
unions and another prospective juror stated that he had been a member of a rival union which
had recently engaged in a riot with the defendant's union. Id. at 1227-30. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that defense counsel's challenge for cause of the juror admitting his bias had been
erroneously denied. Id. at 1230. Defense counsel had additionally challenged for cause the
prospective juror who had been a member of a rival union and coupled this motion with a
request for additional voir dire examination of that juror. The trial court denied both motions.
Id. at 1228. Both jurors were removed through defense counsel's exercise of peremptory
challenges, all of which were exhausted in the course of jury selection. Id. at 1230, n.10. The
majority in Nell found several grounds for reversal, including the failure of the trial judge to
question further the juror who had been a member of a rival union. Id. at 1230. The inade-
quate voir dire examination formed the basis of the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the trial
court did not employ a procedure'"creat[ing] a reasonable assurance that prejudice would
be discovered if present." Id., citing United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir.
1972). For a discussion of circumstances appropriate for challenges for cause and for peremp-
tory challenges, see note 11 supra. For an alternate ground for reversal in Nell, see note 29
infra.
1 The Rucker court restricted its holding so that a trial judge must conduct further voir
dire examination when he has reason to believe that a juror may lack the qualifications for
service "from the information supplied by the venireman themselves ... " 557 F.2d at 1049.
This "narrow" holding in Rucker may implicitly be intended to limit the additional time
expended on such voir dire examination to specific circumstances so as not to prolong voir
dire in all jury trials.
SId.
United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976) exemplifies the exhaus-
tion of peremptory challenges requirement necessary to establish prejudice to the defendant.
Defense counsel in Nell had exhausted all of his allotted peremptory challenges in the jury
selection process and informed the trial court that rulings on the two challenge for cause
motions compelled him to use peremptory challenges on jurors that ought to have been
removed for cause. Id. at 1230. Therefore, since this left defense counsel in the potential
position of not being able to remove a juror prejudicial to the defendant's case, the rulings of
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hausted the allotted peremptory challenges, no harm results from the erro-
neous denial of the challenge for cause because the challenged juror may
be removed by a remaining peremptory challenge. If counsel has exhausted
his peremptory challenges, the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause
possibly allows an incompetent or biased individual to sit as a juror which
would violate the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury.30 The
majority in Rucker failed to follow the exhaustion requirement and the
Fourth Circuit's holding makes clear that any reduction of peremptory
challenges can constitute reversible error .3 Because the Fourth Circuit did
not set forth its rationale for modifying the exhaustion requirement one
possible effect of their holding in Rucker could be to overturn cases on the
appellate level where the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause has not
prejudicially harmed the defendant.
The procedural devices considered in Rucker cannot completely elimi-
nate bias or prejudice from a jury selected for service in a particular case,
as illustrated by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Donovan v. Davis.3 2 The
defendant in Donovan was initially tried and acquitted in state court for
the unauthorized use of an automobile. 3 A second prosecution of the defen-
dant, involving a charge of attempted rape, began one week later in the
same state trial court as his first trial.34 Prior to the second trial, defense
counsel noticed that several of the prospective jurors had served on the jury
which had acquitted the defendant in the first trial . 3 Defense counsel
moved to quash the jury venire,36 objecting to the possibility of prejudice
the trial court's rulings on the challenges for cause could not have been harmless error. Id. at
1230 n.10; see Commonwealth v. Moore, 462 Pa. 231, 340 A.2d 447 (Pa. 1975); People v.
Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 305 N.E.2d 469, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. 1973).
See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (right to impartial jury
denied when prospective jurors with scruples about the death penalty automatically excluded
from jury in capital case); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (right to impartial jury denied
jurors possibly exposed to material prejudicial to defendant).
' In contrast to Nell, see note 29 supra, the court in Rucker stated that "we think that
an erroneous refusal to excuse a juror for cause constitutes reversible error despite the defen-
dant's use of peremptory challenges, where, as here, as a result of the error the number of
peremptory challenges available to the defense is reduced." 557 F.2d at 1049 (emphasis
added).




The motion to quash the jury venire is not a means of challenging an individual juror,
but instead challenges on specific grounds the form and manner in which the jury panel has
been selected. See Paige v. United States, 493 F.2d 22, 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
935 (1974); Virgin Islands v. Williams, 476 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1973); DEvrrr & BLACKMAR, supra
note 1, at § 3.02; WRIGHT, supra note 5, at § 383. Possible grounds on which this challenge
may be made would include a showing that there were members of a jury who had served in
similar previous cases or that there were jurors serving in a second case involving the same
prosecuting attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Riebschlaeger, 528 F.2d 1031, 1032 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); see note 51 infra. The motion to quash the jury venire must
be made before voir dire examination begins or within seven days after defense counsel
discovered, or in the exercise diligence, should have discovered, the grounds for the motion,
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to the defendant through inclusion of jurors from the prior trial on the
prospective jury panel for the attempted rape prosecution.3 7 Instead of
granting this motion, the trial judge indicated to the entire jury panel that
several of its members had been jurors in the recent trial of the alleged
rapist and asked whether any panel member had been influenced by expo-
sure to the first trial.3 Since no member of the panel responded in such a
way as to indicate bias, the judge ordered the selection process continued.
Subsequently, the trial judge admonished the impanelled jury to decide
the case on the evidence presented before it retired to determine a verdict.39
In seeking habeas corpus relief, the defendant in Donovan claimed that
his right to an impartial jury had been violated.when seven jurors from the
first trial were allowed to sit on the second jury which convicted him of
attempted rape."0 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial
of a writ of habeas corpus and held that the service of jurors from the prior
trial of the defendant in the rape proceeding amounted to a denial of due
process." The majority in Donovan concluded that a "substantial likeli-
hood" existed that the jurors common to both trials were not indifferent
in judging evidence presented at the second trial.42 The majority contended
that a possibility of prejudice existed resulting from the exposure of seven
jurors to evidence obtained outside of the rape prosecution.4 3 The Fourth
Circuit also noted that further voir dire examination of these seven jurors
could not have removed the possibility of prejudice because none of the
prospective jurors were aware of the issues to be presented in the second
trial and thus remained ignorant of the relevance of the testimony from
the first trial.
whichever is earlier. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (1970); see United States v. Grose, 525 F.2d 1115,
1118 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976). This motion must contain a sworn
statement of facts, which if true, would constitute a "substantial failure" to comply with
federal statutory provisions in jury selection. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) (1970).
558 F.2d at 202.
Id. For a discussion of the inadequacy of voir dire examination as a means of determin-
ing possible juror prejudice in Donovan, see text accompanying note 44 infra.
558 F.2d at 202.
so Id. at 201-02. Following his conviction for attempted rape, the defendant in Donovan
unsuccessfully sought a writ of error from the Supreme Court of Virginia. Donovan's appeal
to the Fourth Circuit came as a result of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief in
federal district court. Id.
" Id. at 204.
12 Id. at 203.
' Id. Donovan's counsel in the prosecution for attempted rape argued that the prosecu-
trix had consented to sexual relations. With no witnesses to the alleged rape, the trial primar-
ily involved a credibility issue. Id. Testimony at the first trial indicated that the defendant
aggressively sought female companionship, thus increasing the likelihood that those jurors
serving again would not be able to judge the defendant solely on the basis of the evidence
adduced at the second trial. Id. at 202-03.
" Id. at 203. The Fourth Circuit also noted the admonition of the trial judge, see text
accompanying note 39 supra, might have had the "secondary effect" of arousing the curiosity
of the jurors who did not serve in the defendant's earlier trial to question those jurors common
to both trials about the nature of and evidence from the earlier case. Id.
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The "substantial likelihood" standard illustrated in Donovan does not
appear in any previous Fourth Circuit case. Rather than signifying a fixed
standard, "substantial likelihood" most probably represents a conclusion
obtained after the process of examination of the factual circumstances and
issues presented in a given case.45 In Wall v. Superintendent,4" the Fourth
Circuit confronted a due process issue which similarly to Donovan, re-
quired examination of factual circumstances.
The defendant in Wall had served as an alibi witness in a criminal jury
trial prior to his own.17 Several members of the jury in the prior case also
served on the jury in Wall's prosecution." Stressing the relationship estab-
lished between Wall and the previously tried defendant, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the service of five jurors from the earlier trial on the Wall
jury constituted a denial of Wall's due process rights.49 The majority deter-
mined that it was "beyond possibility" for those jurors common to both
trials to have remained impartial at the second trial.50
Whether the "beyond possibility" test conflicts with the "substantial
likelihood" characterization in Donovan is unclear. The stronger possibil-
ity of prejudice in Wall may have compelled that court to utilize stronger
language than the Donovan court. Alternatively, the two cases may indi-
cate that different tests for determining the possibility of juror impartiality
are to be applied in situations where the defendant is tried twice as distin-
guished from cases where the defendant is involved in two trials in two
separate capacities. 5' The Wall majority's concern with the "staunch"
,1 The factual circumstances in Donovan, indicating the possibility that the repeating
jurors might base their verdict on evidence from a prior case, overcame the presumption of
juror impartiality articulated in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); accord, Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878). In closely examining the circumstances for indications
of possible prejudice to the defendant, the Donovan court impliedly rejected the repeating
juror situation as one appropriate for application of a per se theory of implied bias. See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 484 F.2d 176, 177-78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973);
United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980 (2d Cir. 1968); see note 11 supra.
16 553 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 360.
I /d.
' Id. at 361. The Wall court reviewed the nature of the information from the first trial
possessed by those individuals serving as jurors in the second trial. Testimony at the earlier
trial showed that Wall associated with convicted felons. In testifying for the accused in the
earlier trial, Wall also admitted that he had been convicted of a felony, a fact inadmissible
at his own trial because he did not take the stand. Finally, the prosecuting attorney at the
earlier trial implied that Wall had expressed a desire to kill one of the witnesses at the earlier
trial whose testimony in fact resulted in Wall's indictment. Id. at 360-61.
" Id. at 361.
s, The examination of the particular facts of each case performed by courts in the Fourth
Circuit, as well as courts in other circuits, cautions against the formulation of any absolute
rule regarding the status of the defendant in different trials. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Parrot,
551 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir. 1977); Mottram v. Murch, 458 F.2d 626, 630 (1st Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 409 U.S. 41 (1972). Possible juror prejudice may also arise where jurors from
an earlier trial serve in the separate trial of a co-defendant. See United States v. Stevens,
444 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1971); Everitt v. United States, 281 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1960);
Lett v. United States, 15 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1926). Challenges to jurors based on possible
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facts of that case and the characterization of the due process violation as
"flagrant" suggests that the nature of the facts led the Wall court to phrase
the prejudice issue in "beyond possibility" terms rather than in
"substantial likelihood" terms.12 Nevertheless, the uncertainty as to
whether these two cases present two different standards is important in
light of the fact that counsel will have a less difficult time overturning a
lower court decision on the prejudice issue if the "substantial likelihood"
test enunciated in Donovan is applied by the Fourth Circuit.
Rucker, Donovan, and Wall all present issues arising out of the asser-
tion of a violation of the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. The
Fourth Circuit's decisions in these cases indicate the paramount import-
ance of individual factual situations involved in assessing the validity of
these assertions. Thus in Rucker, the majority stressed that circumstances
indicating the possibility of physical or mental disability warranted further
voir dire examination. 3 Similarly, in Donovan and Wall the factual vari-
ances between the two cases induced the Fourth Circuit to characterize the
possibility of prejudice in different terms.54 Rucker, Donovan and Wall
require counsel attacking jury selection procedures to accentuate the
strong likelihood of prejudice to the defendant," as well as the inadequacy
of the procedural mechanisms designed to screen juror incompetence. 6
JOHN F. SHEEHAN
C. The Unavailable Witness Exception to the Right of Confrontation
The right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him is a
common law right that is deeply ingrained in the Anglo-American criminal
justice system.' In the United States, the accused's right to confront the
partiality have also been made in subsequent trials involving the same witnesses and/or
presenting similar legal issues. See United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); United States v. Jones, 486 F.2d 476, 477 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Virgin Islands v. Williams, 476 F.2d 771, 773 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 982 (2d Cir. 1968); Belvin v. United States, 12 F.2d
548, 549 (4th Cir. 1926).
52 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
See text accompanying note 21 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 42 & 50 supra.
Id.
5' See notes 21 & 44 supra.
See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE . The basis of the right to confront one's accusers and the limited exceptions to
this right come from the common law. The development of the right of confrontation was at
least partially in response to the use of ex parte depositions at trial against the accused. See
Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 113 PA. L. REv. 741, 746-47 n.31 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Preserving the
Right to Confrontation].
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witnesses against him is protected by the confrontation clause of the fed-
eral constitution,' state constitutional provisions, 3 and state statutes.' An
accused's right of confrontation usually requires that the government's
witnesses testify at trial under oath with the accused having the right of
cross-examination. 5 The Supreme Court, however, has held that the re-
quirements of the confrontation clause' are satisfied by the admission of a
witness' testimony from a previous judicial hearing if the accused had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the previous hearing7 and the
witness is unavailable to testify at the accused's trial.8 The Court also has
held that the government must make a good faith effort to produce a
witness before the witness may be considered unavailable
In United States v. Mathis,0 the Fourth Circuit held that the prior
testimony of a witness absent at the accused's trial because of a mistake
by the government was admissible since the government had made a rea-
sonable attempt to produce the witness. In Mathis, defendants Mathis and
Moore were convicted of armed bank robbery." During the trial that ended
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . .to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
3 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6 [I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a
right. . .to be confronted by the witnesses against him. ... ). See also, WiGMoRE, supra
note 1, at § 1397 n.1.
See, e.g;, N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-06 (1974) In all criminal prosecutions the party
accused shall have the right. . .[t]o meet the witnesses against him face to face .... ");
HAW. REv. STAT. § 801-2 (1976) (accused "shall have a right to meet the witnesses, who are
produced against him, face to face. ... ). See also WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1397 n.1.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (accused deprived of right to be confronted
with witnesses against him when principal evidence against him was reading of transcript of
testimony from preliminary hearing of witness in jail in neighboring state at time of trial).
See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
' Since Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the case in which the Supreme Court held
that the confrontation clause applies to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the confrontation clause has overshadowed the state constitutional
provisions and statutes which also protect the accused's right of confrontation. See note 3 &
4 supra.
I The accused must have been represented by counsel at the previous hearing and coun-
sel must have been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). In all cases admitting prior testimony of unavaila-
ble witnesses, the prior testimony and right to cross-examine occurred at a hearing involving
the same issue contested at the trial in which the previous testimony was admitted. Usually
the prior hearings are either prior trials, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895),
or preliminary hearings, West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 258-259 (1904); Motes v. United
States, 178 U.S. 458, 467 (1900).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (transcript of testimony of witness at prior
trial admissible when witness died before second trial).
I Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (absence of witness from court's jurisdiction does
not make witness unavailable unless government has made good faith effort to secure his
presence at trial). See also Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Oliver v. Rundle, 417
F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970); Wilson v. Bowie,
408 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1969).
" 550 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1140 (1977).
550 F.2d at 181.
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in the conviction of the defendants, one of the government's principal
witnesses could not be located. The witness' absence was a result of a
mistake by the government in releasing her from federal custody.' 2 The
district court judge allowed the admission of the witness' testimony from
a previous mistrial.'3
On appeal from their convictions, Mathis and Moore contended that
the trial court erred in admitting the witness' previous testimony. 4 In
affirming the convictions in a per curiam decision," the Fourth Circuit
considered the admissibility of the witness' prior statements as primarily
a hearsay question." The court held that the prior testimony exception to
the hearsay rule,'7 as codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804,"1 allowed
12 Id. The witness, Karen Jones, was erroneously released from the District of Columbia
House of Correction pursuant to a court order directing the release of another prisoner bearing
the same name.
,3 The mistrial was a result of the failure of the jury to reach a verdict. Brief for Appellant
at 3, United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1976).
" 550 F.2d at 181. Relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(e)(6), the defendants also contended that the trial court erred in allowing the
use, for impeachment purposes, of a statement made by the witness at the time he pleaded
guilty to a related charge. Id. at 182.
The purpose of Rule of Evidence 410 and Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) is to
facilitate the plea bargaining system. Few defendants would plead guilty as a part of a plea
bargaining compromise if it were possible for the court to refuse the plea bargain and then
allow the guilty plea to be used against the defendants at trial. Furthermore, as the Supreme
Court noted in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927), to admit a withdrawn
guilty plea into evidence would be in direct conflict with the decision to allow the withdrawal.
However, the language of Rule of Evidence 410 and Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6)
states that the two rules are applicable to guilty pleas only if the guilty plea is being used in
a proceeding against the person who made the plea after the plea has been withdrawn. In
Mathis, this condition was not met. 550 F.2d at 182. Since the witness' guilty plea in Mathis
was never withdrawn, the use of the plea did not interfere with the effectiveness of the plea
bargaining process. Id. Such use is consistent with both the aim and the language of Federal
Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) (6). Since no other reasons
exist to exclude such pleas for impeachment purposes, the Mathis court properly held that
the witness' guilty plea could be used to impeach his credibility.
25 Justice Widener dissented from the denial of defendant's petition for rehearing be-
cause he believed that admitting a witness' prior testimony when the witness' absence at trial
was due to the government's actions violated the confrontation clause. United States v.
Mathis, 550 F.2d 183, 184 (1976) (Widener, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
"6 Hearsay evidence is defined as "testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement
made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters
asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court as-
serter." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
McCORMICK]. The traditional prohibition against the admissibility of hearsay evidence is
continued by Federal Rule of Evidence 802. The Federal Rules of Evidence also codify most
of the common law exceptions to the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVD. 801, 803, 804.
27 Exceptions to the hearsay rule developed because of pressure on the courts to receive
as much probative evidence as possible. Preserving the Right to Confrontation, supra note 1,
at 747. Several exceptions have developed in situations where the witness is not available to
testify, but certain conditions lend credibility to the admission of the evidence. See FED. R.
EVID. 804. One such exception permits the admission of former testimony given at a previous
judicial proceeding by a witness who is unavailable at trial. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1);
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the admission of the witness' prior testimony." In reaching its decision, the
court reasoned that since reasonable attempts were made to find the wit-
ness, the unavailability test of Rule 804(a)(5)2" had been met. Once the
court found the witness unavailable, Rule 804(b)(1)"1 allowed the admis-
sion of the witness' previous testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule.
While some authorities claim the confrontation clause and the hearsay
rule protect the same right,"2 the Supreme Court has stated that although
the rights protected by the two overlap, they are not identical.3 The most
obvious difference between the two is that the confrontation clause is appl-
icable only in criminal prosecutions and may be invoked only by the ac-
cused, while the hearsay rule may be invoked by any party in civil or
criminal proceedings. In addition, the primary goal of the confrontation
clause is to protect at trial a defendant faced with possible criminal sanc-
tions, 24 while the primary goal of the hearsay rule is to insure the credibility
MCCORMICK, supra note 13, at § 253. This exception is based on the perception that the right
to cross-examine the witness is the most important condition under which the hearsay rule
requires witnesses to testify. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1395. The right to cross-examine is
fulfilled if the adverse party or party in like interest has had an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness regarding substantially the same issue at a previous judicial proceeding.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1386. The common law unavailable witness exception to the
hearsay rule and the unavailable witness exception to the confrontation clause are based on
the same requirements. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1397.
11 FED. R. EVID. 804. Rule 804 is identical to the common law unavailable witness excep-
tion except for one key area. The common law exception did not apply if the witness' absence
was due to the wrong doing of the proponent of the statement. K. SOLzBERG, & S. REDDEN,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 601 (2d ed. 1977). Rule 804 continues this requirement
only when the proponent has as his purpose "preventing the witness from attending or
testifying." FED. R. EvID. 804(a). There was no evidence the government had such a purpose
in Mathis.
" 550 F.2d at 181-82.
FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(5) states that a witness is unavailable if he "is absent from the
hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by
process or other reasonable means."
21 FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) allows the admission of previous testimony given as a witness
at another hearing if the party against whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity and
similar motive to examine the witness.
2 See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1397(a).
2 While the Supreme Court decided several early cases dealing with the right of confron-
tation, see, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934), it was not until recently that the Court attempted to determine the relation-
ship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule. While the Court recognized in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), that some types of hearsay were constitutionally
permissible, id. at 407, the Court did not attempt to explain the difference between constitu-
tionally permissible and impermissible hearsay. Not until California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970), and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970), did the Court actually state that
the confrontation clause and hearsay rule are not identical. See Younger, Confrontation and
Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HoFsTRA L. REv. 32 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Younger].
21 Preserving the Right to Confrontation, supra note 1, at 747. The Supreme Court has
elaborated on the basic goal of the confrontation clause by stating that the objective of the
confrontation clause is to prevent depositions or ex parte documents from being used against
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of testimony.? The hearsay rule protects the trier of fact's ability to decide
a case, as well as protecting the opposing party.26 Since the confrontation
clause and the hearsay rule are not identical, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the confrontation clause can be violated by the admission
of testimony that is otherwise admissible under one of the hearsay excep-
tions.27
I After determining in Mathis, a criminal case, that the admission of the
prior testimony was consistent with federal hearsay rules, the Fourth Cir-
cuit should have determined whether the admission was consistent with
the confrontation clause.? The court, however, did not even discuss this
issue. Only in distinguishing a case which dealt with the confrontation
clause" did the court give any indication that Mathis presented a confron-
tation question.
The facts in Mathis do satisfy the two conditions established by the
Supreme Court for meeting the requirements of the confrontation clause
when the witness is not going to appear at trial."0 The defendants did not
contest the fact that they had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness
at the previous mistrial." In addition, the government's brief indicated
that the government did make the good faith effort to produce the witness
that is required for the witness to be judged unavailable.2
The government's responsibility for the absence of the witness in
the accused in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness. Douglas
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) quoting, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895).
2 United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 1969) (dictum) (hearsay is
generally inadmissible because it h-as no inherent likelihood of truthfulness). See also
McCoRMICK, supra note 13, at § 245.
Is Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HAxv. L.
REv. 177, 184, 185 (1948).
1 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (dictum) (admission of statements
under California's inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay rule did not violate federal
confrontation clause).
u" The Mathis court's failure to discuss whether the admission of the witness' testimony
conflicted with the confrontation clause may be explained by the fact that the brief for
appellant Mathis treated the issue as a hearsay question. While Mathis' brief mentioned the
confrontation clause in several places, the thrust of its argument was aimed at a violation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, not the confrontation clause. Brief for Appellant at 9-18,
United States v. Mathis, 500 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1976).
n The court attempted to distinguish Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). See
text accompanying notes 32-39 infra.
:' See text accompanying notes 7 & 8 supra.
=' Brief for Appellant, United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1976).
32 According to the government's brief, FBI agents attempted to locate the fugitive wit-
ness by contacting all of her known associates and by going to her last known address. Brief
for Appellee at 6, United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1976). The witness' boy-
friend and other confidential sources were also contacted. In addition, the witness' name was
placed on file so that if she were apprehended by other law enforcement agencies, she would
be held for the FBI. Id. The government's efforts must be viewed in light of the fact that a
good faith effort does not require that every lead, no matter how nebulous, be completely
exhausted. Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Mathis, however, is factually similar to Motes v. United States. In Motes,
the government introduced testimony previously given at the preliminary
hearing by a witness who was missing at the defendant's trial for conspir-
acy and murder.34 The witness' disappearance occurred after the govern-
ment allowed the witness to stay in a hotel in the custody of another
witness rather than in jail.3 In reversing the conviction of all but one of
the defendants, 3 the Supreme Court held that the admission of prior testi-
mony in cases where the witness' absence was due to the government's
negligence violates the confrontation clause.31
To justify its decision in Mathis, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the
government's actions in Mathis and the governmental conduct in Motes.
The court characterized the government's actions in Mathis as
"inadvertent" while describing the government's actions in Motes as a
"reckless disregard of an obligation to produce" a witness.38 In Motes,
however, the Supreme Court characterized the government's action as
negligent, not as a reckless disregard of an obligation to produce the wit-
ness.39 Arguably, the government's conduct in releasing the witness in
Mathis also could be characterized as negligent. Therefore, the Mathis
decision, in effect, limits the scope of Motes in the Fourth Circuit to those
cases in which the government's actions can be characterized not only as
negligent, but also as a reckless disregard of an obligation to produce a
witness.
In determining whether Mathis was decided correctly in light of Motes,
it is important to realize that the Fourth Circuit was forced to balance two
important considerations: the need to make sure the accused received a
fair trial and the trial court's need to hear as much relevant evidence as
possible in order to determine accurately the facts of the case. In Mathis,
there was no indication the government intentionally attempted to keep
the witness from the trial"0 in order to gain some advantage. Furthermore,
the witness' testimony was important in determining the facts of the case.
To allow the defendants in Mathis to use the confrontation clause to pre-
vent the court from hearing the testimony of the missing witness would
have transformed the sixth amendment from a shield to-protect the defen-
dants into a sword with which they might thwart justice. It is unlikely that
the Supreme Court intended this result when it decided Motes. Therefore,
while the exact question in Mathis has not been decided by other circuits,'
178 U.S. 458, 468 (1900).
31 Id. at 460-61, 467.
Id. at 471.
The conviction of defendant Motes was not reversed since the Court held that there
was conclusive evidence of his guilt independent of the witness' statement. Id. at 475.
11 Id. at 474.
550 F.2d at 182.
3, 178 U.S. at 471.
550 F.2d at 181-82.
" Oliver v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1969), most closely resembles the fact situation
in Mathis. In Rundle, an adult defendant and a juvenile co-defendant were charged with
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it appears that the Fourth Circuit's decision was correct.
The major problem with the Mathis decision is the Fourth Circuit's
failure to set out its reasoning. The court did not distinguish between the
question of whether the witness' testimony was admissible under the hear-
say rule and the question of whether the testimony was admissible under
the confrontation clause. Distinguishing between the confrontation clause
and the hearsay rule would allow the Fourth Circuit to expand and supple-
ment the classically recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule without
violating the constitutional provision."
The court's failure to explain the Mathis decision in more detail leaves
a great deal of uncertainty as to how future cases involving the admission
of prior testimony from witnesses unavailable at trial because of govern-
mental actions might be decided. Much of the uncertainty centers around
what type of governmental action is to be considered "recklessness" as in
Motes and what is to be considered "inadvertence" as in Mathis.4 3 The
court gave no guidelines in Mathis for making such determinations. In
addition, the fact that the Supreme Court has expressed no interest in
clarifying this areaA serves to heighten the uncertainty involved in predict-
ing how future cases will be decided.
KURT L. JONES
D. Materiality of Undisclosed Evidence
When the prosecution knowingly uses perjured testimony to secure a
conviction, the defendant suff~ers a violation of his fifth amendment due
burglary and rape. 417 F.2d at 305. Following the defendant's preliminary hearing, the juve-
nile escaped from a youth center to which he had been sent after having been judged a
delinquent. Id. at 306. The juvenile's testimony from the hearing was introduced into evi-
dence by the government at the trial which ended in the conviction of the defendant. Id. The
Third Circuit, stressing that the government had made a good faith effort to find the co-
defendant, held that the admission of the testimony did not violate the confrontation clause.
Id. While the facts in Rundle are sinlilar to the facts in Mathis, there is no indication in the
court's opinion that the juvenile's escape from the youth center was in any way the fault of
the government. Since the witness' absence was not due to any governmental action, Rundle
does not deal with the same question presented in Mathis.
" WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1397(b). See Younger, supra note 23, at 37, which lists
three advantages in distinguishing between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule: the
need to reform the hearsay rule, the exclusion from the confrontation clause of hearsay
exceptions not mentioned in the confrontation clause, and the desire of lawyers to keep the
Constitution as elegant as possible.
,1 For a discussion of what government action is to be considered "recklessness" and
what is to be considered "inadvertence," see text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
" The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Mathis and Rundle. United States v.
Mathis, 550 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1140 (1977); Oliver v. Rundle,
417 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970).
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process rights, and a new trial is warranted.' On the other hand, failure to
disclose evidence to the defense which affects the credibility of a govern-
ment witness constitutes reversible error only when a reasonable likelihood
exists that knowledge of the undisclosed evidence could have affected the
jury's judgment.2 In United States v. Sutton,3 the Fourth Circuit consid-
ered whether nondisclosure of a threat by a government agent to prosecute
a witness, without whose testimony the State had only a circumstantial
case, violated defendant's due process rights.' The court held that due
process had been denied and that a new trial was warranted.
The defendants in Sutton were convicted of conspiring to rob a bank;5
they sought a new trial on the ground that the prosecution failed to disclose
a threat made to the State's key witness, one Redfus Cannon, by an agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.' The district court found that the
new trial motion was based upon Cannon's recantation of his testimony
and denied the motion.7 The appellate court viewed the motion as an
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct and granted a new trial.'
Cannon testified at trial that he loaned defendants his car for the
purpose of committing a robbery The trial prosecutor assured the jury
that no one had threatened Cannon to induce his testimony.'0 At a post-
trial hearing," an FBI agent testified that prior to trial he had accused
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935). The Mooney Court, stressing the duty
of the prosecutor to assure that justice is done, ruled .that the prosecution's knowing use of
perjured testimony constitutes A violation of due process guarantees. In Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), the Court held that inaccurate and false misrepresentations
created by the prosecutor constitute grounds for reversal when the evidence against the
defendant is not overwhelming. Id. at 84-89; see text accompanying note 39 infra.
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); see note 24 infra.
542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1240. The defendants were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) which makes
conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States a crime punishable by a fine of
not more than $10,000 and/or a prison term of not more than five years. The defendants
allegedly attempted to rob a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, thus
making the conspiracy one against the United States. Brief for Appellee at 4, United States
v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976); see Scott v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 680, 681
(E.D. Ky. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 847 (1962); 18 U.S.C. §
371 (1970).
542 F.2d at 1240.
Id. After defendants' trial, their attorneys obtained statements from Cannon in which
he recanted his pre-trial statements and trial testimony. After an evidentiary hearing before
the trial judge, the district court concluded that Cannon's recantation was a lie concocted to
prevent his friends (the defendants) from having to go to jail. Brief for Appellee at 20. The
acceptance or rejection of a witness' recantation is discretionary with the trial judge. United
States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966); see United
States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278 (4th Cir. 1973).
542 F.2d at 1243.
' Id. at 1241.
, Id. The prosecutor in fact had no actual knowledge that the FBI agent threatened to
implicate Cannon as the driver of the car used in the attempted robbery. Id. at 1241 n.2; see
text accompanying notes 23-24 infra.
" The defense apparently based its new trial motion on FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 which
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Cannon of driving the car when in fact the agent knew someone else had
driven it. The agent further testified that he had made this threat to
frighten Cannon into revealing the entire story of the events surrounding
the alleged attempted robbery. 2 The defense moved for a new trial on the
ground that the prosecution had not revealed this threat to the defense
prior to trial. 3
The Fourth Circuit held that failure to disclose threats made to a prose-
cution witness by a government agent-an error compounded in.Sutton by
the trial prosecutor's incorrect assurances to the jury that Cannon had not
been threatened with prosecution-violated defendants' fifth amendment
due process guarantees. 4 Moreover, the court ruled that knowledge of a
government agent is imputed to the prosecutor 5 and that a threat to prose-
cute is tantamount to an understanding or agreement as to a future prose-
cution. 6
The Sutton decision followed the reasoning developed by the Supreme
Court's Napue-Brady-Giglio trilogy concerning materiality of the prosecu-
tor's undisclosed evidence. In Napue v. Illinois,7 the Court held that a
prosecutor's knowing acquiesence in the false testimony of a government
witness constituted a due process violation even though the false testimony
went solely to the credibility of the witness. 8 The Court in Brady v.
permits a court, upon defendant's motion, to grant a new trial if the interests of justice so
require. Rule 33 further directs that a motion for a new trial must be made within two years
of final judgment. In a criminal case, the sentence is the final judgment. Berman v. United
States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937).
12 542 F.2d at 1241. The agent also testified that he may have suggested to Cannon that
if Cannon were accused of driving th6 car, a jury would believe the agent and not Cannon.
Id.
' Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1243.
" Id. at 1241 n.2. This holding comports with the earlier Fourth Circuit case of Boone v.
Paderick, 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977). The Boone court
held that the offer of a police detective to speak to the Commonwealth's Attorney about
possible leniency for a witness must be imputed to the prosecutor regardless of his knowledge
of the fact. Id. at 450-51.
11 542 F.2d at 1242. See note 24 infra.
" 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
I Id. at 269. The defendant in Napue was convicted of murder. The principal state
witness, in response to a question by the Assistant State's Attorney, testified that he received
no promises of leniency in return for testifying. However, the Assistant State's Attorney had
in fact offered leniency but took no steps to correct the perjured testimony. Id. at 265. The
Supreme Court found that the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony, even though
the perjury issue went only to the credibility of the witness, violated defendant's due process
rights. Id. at 269. See also Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (knowing use of perjured
testimony which concerned defendant's state of mind at time of killing constituted denial of
due process); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1953) (knowing use of perjured testimony to
procure a conviction violative of due process); sources cited at note 20 infra.
Ordinarily evidence discovered by the defense after trial which goes solely to the credibil-
ity of a witness does not constitute sufficient grounds for a new trial. Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 (1956); United States v. Fannon, 491 F.2d 129, 132 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1002-03 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 919 (2d Cir. 1966).
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Maryland'9 expanded this concept in holding that the prosecutor's failure
to disclose evidence requested by the defendant was also a due process
violation irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith."0 Finally in
Giglio v. United States,' the Court relied on agency principles 2 to rule that
the knowledge of one government attorney must be imputed to all govern-
ment attorneys in the case. 2 Hence, even though the trial prosecutor was
unaware of an earlier prosecutor's promise of leniency to a key witness, the
trial prosecutor was deemed to have had constructive knowledge of the
earlier promise.
2 4
Later however, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Agurs21 restricted the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence in his posses-
sion. In Agurs, the Court held that exculpatory material withheld by the
prosecution must be judged in light of the entire record. 21 Since no duty is
" 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 Id. at 87. The Brady defendant and a companion were sentenced to death for first
degree murder. Prior to trial, defendant asked the prosecutor for the companion's extrajudi-
cial statements. One statement, in which the companion admitted to having performed the
actual killing, was withheld. The Supreme Court granted defendant a new trial on the issue
of punishment alone (life sentence or death). Id. at 84-85, 88-91; see Comment, Materiality
and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining the Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure, 59 IowA L. REv.
433 (1973); Comment, Suppression: The Prosecution Failure to Disclose Evidence Favorable
to the Defendant, 7 U. S. F. L. REv. 348 (1973); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the
Prosecutors Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 112 (1972); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitu-
tional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L. J. 136 (1964).
21 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
The Supreme Court cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957) for the proposi-
tion that the knowledge of any prosecutor must be imputed to the Government. Section 272,
Comment g of the RESTATEMENT states that a principal "may be affected by the knowledge
of an agent not authorized to do the act. . .in which knowledge is important if the act. . .is
one in which the principal is responsible for his agent's conduct." Hence the prosecutor's
office is deemed to have constructive knowledge of promises of leniency made by the prosecu-
tor handling a case before the grand jury even though the trial prosecutor is unaware of such
promises. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); see note 24 infra.
' 405 U.S. at 154; see note 24 infra.
2, 405 U.S. at 154. The defendant in Giglio was convicted after a trial in which the
government's key witness falsely testified that he had received no promise of leniency in
return for his testimony. Id. at 151-52. The trial attorney for the government was unaware
that an earlier government attorney impliedly had promised leniency to the witness. Id. at
152. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that defendant's due process rights were violated
and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 154-55. The Court further stated that "evidence of any
understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his [the witness']
credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it." Id. at 155. See also sources cited at note
20 supra.
2 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
2" Id. at 112. The defendant in Agurs was convicted of a knife murder. Her defense was
that the decedent had attempted to kill her. Defendant sought a new trial on the ground that
the prosecution failed to reveal decedent's two guilty pleas to charges of carrying a deadly
weapon-the weapons apparently being knives. The government countered that the defense
requested no such information, and moreover that the prior record was immaterial. Id. at 98-
101. The district court denied the motion, finding that evidence of decedent's violent nature
had been admitted into evidence. Id. at 101-02. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed
upon a finding that the jury might have decided otherwise had it known of decedent's crimi-
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imposed upon the prosecutor to disclose all of his records, " he must decide
prior to trial what material must be revealed to the defense to insure
protection of the defendant's due process rights.28 The prosecutor must
reveal any information which raises a reasonable doubt as to the defen-
dant's guilt. On appeal, the reviewing court applies this same reasonable
doubt standard to determine if the prosecution's withholding of evidence
warrants a new trial.
2 9
In Sutton, the Fourth Circuit elected to apply the Giglio rather than
the Agurs standard of materiality, categorizing Agurs as a "discovery" case
and Giglio as a "veracity" case.30 As explained by the Sutton court, Agurs
concerned evidence withheld by the prosecution which bore no direct rela-
tion to the credibility of a witness. In that case the standard of materiality
was whether the undisclosed evidence could have created a reasonable
doubt not otherwise present as to defendant's guilt.3 ' Giglio, on the other
hand, involved prosecutorial misconduct that went to the credibility of a
witness.3 2 The standard there applied was whether the omitted evidence
would have created a reasonable likelihood that the jurors would have
doubted the veracity of the witness' testimony.3 3 The fact that Agurs does
not alter the materiality standard to be applied in a Giglio situation, where
a state witness falsely testifies that he received no promise of leniency in
return for his testimony, follows from the language of the Agurs opinion.34
nal record. Id. at 102. The Supreme Court viewed the issue as one concerning the due process
rights of the defendant. Id. at 107. Adding that the matter must be viewed in light of the
entire record, the Court stated, "[i]f there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not
the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial." Id. at 112-13.
Since the trial judge had applied this standard, the denial of the motion was reinstated. Id.
at 113-14.
Id. at 109. Merely because some undisclosed fact might have aided the defense or
might have altered the outcome, the prosecutor is not under a duty to open his files to the
defense. On the other hand, ignorance of material evidence that is in his file does not excuse
his duty to disclose. "If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because
of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor." Id. at 110. See Moore
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (undisclosed evidence not material under set of facts presented
even though defense requested disclosure); but see, United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642,
650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (tapes sought by defense allegedly lost; case remanded for determina-
tion whether loss of tapes was inadvertent, negligent, or willful).
427 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 112-13. See United States v. McCrane, 527 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 906 (1976); United States v. Fannon, 491 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1974); Dietz, The
Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence in the Absence of a Fo-
cused Request From the Defense-United States v. Agurs, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 319, 322-23
(1976); cf. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (not reversible error where admitted
evidence does not seem to appellate court to have affected jury's finding). See also note 50
infra.
542 F.2d at 1241-42.
' Id. at 1242. See note 27 supra.
" See note 25 supra.
" United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959).
3' United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). See Annunziato v. Manson, No. 77-
2017 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 1977). Likewise the Brady rule remains unchanged by Agurs. 427 U.S.
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No other circuits have distinguished Agurs and Giglio as the Fourth
Circuit did in Sutton due to what appears to be the unique factual situa-
tion of the Sutton case-the government had neither constructive nor ac-
tual knowledge of any possibly perjured statements made by Cannon.
The Sutton distinction, however, is consistent with the general tenor of
both Agurs and Giglio, that corruption of the truth-finding process, as
opposed to fact-finding, warrants a stricter standard of materiality.' 6
Only three minor differences prevented Sutton from falling directly
into the Giglio factual setting. First, in Sutton, the witness was threatened
with prosecution rather than having been promised leniency as in Giglio.
The Fourth Circuit ascertained no difference between threats to prosecute
and promises of leniency since under either circumstance the witness had
a compelling motivation for testifying. 7 Secondly, the threat was made by
an FBI agent and not a prosecutor. The Sutton court's finding that the
prosecutor bore responsibility for knowledge of the agent's threat echoes
the Giglio court's statement that the office of the prosecutor acts as the
spokesman for the entire government." Finally, the only verified "perjury"
committed in Sutton was the prosecutor's false assurance to the jury that
no one had threatened Cannon. Language in the Giglio opinion, however,
substantiates the Fourth Circuit's assertion that false assurances to a jury
by a prosecutor are as much a violation of a defendant's due process rights
as explicit perjured testimony2 Since Cannon played a major role in the
prosecution's case as did the witness in Giglio, these three findings fit
Sutton almost identically into the Giglio mold."
The government, however, argued that even application of the Giglio
standard of materiality did not warrant a new trial. The government con-
tended that any effect that knowledge of the agent's threat would have had
on the jury was mitigated by Cannon's trial testimony.' The government
at 104-07. See Wagster v. Overberg, 560 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1977); but see United States v.
Crisp, 563 F.2d 1242, 1245 (5th Cir. 1977) (failure to disclose exculpatory statement by witness
not grounds for new trial when statement was subsequently repudiated).
11 Cannon never stated that he had not been threatened with prosecution. 542 F.2d at
1242-43. See note 7 supra. The government prosecutor, however, falsely assured the jury that
Cannon had not been threatened. Id. at 1241.
"' United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150,
153-54 (1972).
3 542 F.2d at 1242; see United States v. Grasso, 552 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977), petition for
cert. filed, No. 76-1543, 46 U.S.L.W. 3089 (Aug. 30, 1977) (prosecution witness recanted
testimony to defense counsel stating that government prosecutors and Internal Revenue
agents threatened him; trial judge declared sua sponte a mistrial). "[Elvidence of any
understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility
and the jury was entitled to know of it." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972)
(emphasis added).
405 U.S. at 154. See notes 15 & 22 supra.
3' See note 37 supra.
"° The witness whose testimony was challenged in Giglio was, like Cannon, a crucial part
of the prosecution's case. Without the testimony of the principal witness in Giglio, no indict-
ment would have been issued. 405 U.S. at 154.
" 542 F.2d at 1242-43.
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based this contention upon Cannon's testimony that FBI officials told him
that "things would go better" for him if he made a statement.2 The Sutton
court reasoned that although this testimony might have caused the jury
to discount Cannon's fear of prosecution as the admitted lender of the car,
the jury might have been more impressed by the knowledge of Cannon's
fear that the agent would falsely place him at the scene of the crime as
the driver of the car.43 Hence, on the basis of the prosecutor's false assur-
ances to the jury that Cannon had not been threatened, the credibility
issue raised by the agent's threat, and the otherwise circumstantial nature
of the government's case, the Fourth Circuit found that Cannon's testi-
mony violated the defendants' fifth amendment due process rights and
granted a new trial.4
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the differences underlying the constitu-
tional philosophies expressed in Agurs and Giglio necessarily concerned
the applicable materiality standard under the set of facts presented. 5
Agurs represented a case of the prosecutor's independent exercise of judg-
ment in determining what matters to disclose,46 and the standard applied
was whether information withheld by the prosecutor raises a reasonable
doubt as to defendant's guilt. 7 In Giglio however, the prosecutor, although
unaware, was a party to perjury, a corruption not of the fact-finding pro-
cess, but rather of the truth-finding process." The defendant's burden then
became one of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that disclosure would
have affected the judgment." In applying the Giglio reasonable likelihood
standard, the Fourth Circuit in Sutton has underscored the duty of the
prosecutor to assure that justice is done rather than seeking convictions at
any price.50
MARK R. DAVIS
'z Id. at 1243.
'I Id.
"Id.
'5 The undisclosed evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976). Courts have applied one of three materiality tests.
First, if the newly discovered evidence is from a neutral source, the defendant must demon-
strate that that evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal. Secondly, where the
evidence was known to the prosecution but not disclosed, it must have been such as to create
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jurors. Thirdly, where a corruption of the truth-finding
process results from prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show a reasonable likeli-
hood exists that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. United
States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1242 n.3 (4th Cir. 1976).
' 427 U.S. at 101.
'7 Id. at 112-13.
' See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
' Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
W' See note 1 supra; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-103(B).
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